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I. INTRODUCTION 
Most events covered by insurance happen at a fixed point in time.  
Accordingly, in the typical context, timing issues relating to coverage 
under commercial general liability (CGL) insurance policies relate to 
whether the bodily injury or property damage happened during a 
particular policy period.  This question is usually described as whether 
the policy is “triggered.”  In the context of the usual claim, a court 
simply determines when the injury or damage took place, and whether 
the relevant policy was in effect at that time. 
Environmental, toxic tort, and some products liability claims, 
however, present more complex timing issues.  These types of claims 
often involve progressive injuries or damage happening over substantial 
timeframes.  In the insurance industry, such losses are often called “long-
tail” claims.  Many long-tail claims involve injury or damage spanning 
multiple policy years.  A court considering timing issues relating to 
coverage for such claims is faced not only with the challenge of 
determining which policies are triggered, but also with a far more 
complicated question: whether and how to allocate the damages between 
the relevant insurers and between the insurers and the policyholder. 
The most common approach used to determine how to allocate long-
tail losses among multiple triggered policy years is often called “pro rata 
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by time-on-the-risk allocation.”
1
  Under the pro rata approach, the 
relevant damages are simply spread equally across all of the years in 
which the continuous injury or damage took place.
2
  However, some 
jurisdictions have taken a completely different tack, known as “all sums” 
liability.  Under the all sums scheme, each policy year during any of the 
years in which the continuous injury or damage took place is deemed 
liable to pay for the entire loss up to the limits of the insurance available 
in that year.
3
  The policyholder is then free to choose any triggered 
policy period to respond to the claim, leaving the selected insurers to 




Courts applying the all sums approach typically rely on the isolated 
phrase “all sums,” which appears in the insuring agreement in many 
CGL policies.  Those insuring agreements commonly state that the 
insurer will “pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured 
shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of bodily 
injury or property damage to which this insurance applies caused by an 
occurrence.”
5
  Courts applying this approach ignore the phrase “bodily 
injury or property damage to which this insurance applies” in the 
insuring agreement, as well as all of the other policy language that this 
phrase brings into play.
6
  Under all sums liability, each triggered policy 
is liable for “all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to 
pay” for the claim up to its limits of liability, including amounts due to 
injury or damage that happened outside of the period of the policy.
7
 
There is a multiplicity of reasons why it is improper for a court to 
ignore the plain language of these policies in order to apply the all sums 
approach.  Without purporting to be comprehensive, this Article 
                                                          
 1.   3-22 NEW APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE LAW LIBRARY EDITION § 22.03[2] (Jeffrey E. 
Thomas ed.) (2015). 
 2.   Id. 
 3.  Thomas M. Jones, An Introduction to Insurance Allocation Issues in Multiple-Trigger 
Cases, 10 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 25, 38 (1999).  
 4.  Id. at 37–38. 
 5.  Andrew Weiner & Joseph Saka, The Basics of Commercial General Liability Policies, AM. 
BAR ASS’N, 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/young_lawyers/publications/the_101_201_practice_series/the_b
asics_of_commercial_general_liability_policies.html. (emphasis added) (last visited Oct. 6, 2015). 
 6.  See infra Part I.B. 
 7.  See, e.g., Keene Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034, 1049–50 (D.C. Cir. 1981); 
Hercules, Inc. v. AIU Ins. Co., 784 A.2d 481, 493–94 (Del. 2001); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Dana Corp., 
759 N.E.2d 1049, 1058 (Ind. 2001); Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 769 
N.E.2d 835, 841 (Ohio 2002); J.H. Fr. Refractories Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 626 A.2d 502, 507–08 
(Pa. 1993); Am. Nat’l Fire Ins. Co. v. B & L Trucking & Constr. Co., 951 P.2d 250, 256–57 (Wash. 
1998); Plastics Eng’g Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 759 N.W.2d 613, 616 (Wis. 2009). 
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highlights the following problems with those decisions that have ignored 
cardinal principles of contract construction to reach the all sums result: 
(1)  All sums liability is fundamentally inconsistent with a continuous 
trigger for long-tail claims; 
(2)  A court must improperly ignore the policy period limitations in 
CGL policies to impose all sums liability; 
(3)  All sums liability violates the parties’ reasonable expectations; and 
(4)  All sums liability unjustly enriches policyholders. 
In addition to the impropriety of ignoring the above points, courts 
deciding to apply the all sums approach generally do not fully appreciate 
the magnitude and complexity of the follow-on litigation that will result 
from adopting that approach.  Some of the more prominent conundrums 
that these courts will have to resolve in this context are: 
(1)  how to construe and how to apply the “prior insurance/non-




(2)  how to construe, reconcile and apply the “other insurance” clauses 
found in CGL policies under the all sums scheme;
9
 
(3)  how to construe and apply subrogation clauses in the relevant 
policies, and how to apply equitable contribution principles as between 
insurers; and 
(4)  how settlements that the policyholder may have reached previously 
with some of its insurers impact reallocation among the remaining 
insurers, and how to address the potentially contentious discovery 
disputes that may arise from the need to ascertain the terms of the 
pertinent prior settlement agreements. 
Accordingly, in addition to discussing the impropriety of the all sums 
result from a contract construction perspective, this Article also 
addresses the above issues. 
Finally, this Article discusses how the pro rata allocation approach 
avoids all of the flaws underlying the all sums scheme and the practical 
problems arising under that scheme.  Based on these points, this Article 
                                                          
 8.  See infra Part III.A. 
 9.  See infra Part III.B. 
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concludes that courts should apply pro rata allocation to assigning 
responsibility for damages arising from long-tail claims. 
II. “ALL SUMS” IGNORES CARDINAL PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT 
CONSTRUCTION AND UNJUSTLY BENEFITS THE POLICYHOLDER  
As discussed more fully below, all sums liability blatantly disregards 
the fundamental principles of contract construction governing the 
interpretation of any insurance policy by enabling a policyholder to hold 
a single policy year accountable for damages due to injury or damage 
potentially spanning decades. 
First, all sums liability is inconsistent with a continuous trigger 
theory of liability, which presumes that damage or injury arising from 
long-tail claims is progressive and indivisible.  Although this theory does 
not provide any means by which to ascertain the amount of damage 
happening within any given policy period, all sums liability would 
permit a policyholder to impose liability on an insurer for damages 
attributable to injury or damage taking place well after the termination of 
that insurer’s policy. 
Second, the all sums approach subverts the explicit temporal 
limitations appearing in CGL policies, which provide that the insurer is 
not liable for damages arising from damage or injury happening before 
or after the policy period.  As a result, policyholders effectively receive 
premium-free insurance because insurers are forced to pay for damages 
that they did not agree to insure. 
Third, the all sums scheme violates the doctrine of reasonable 
expectations applied by some courts, under which ambiguities in an 
insurance policy are construed against the insurer when the policyholder 
has an objectively reasonable expectation of coverage.  The reason for 
this is clear: no reasonable policyholder would expect that a single 
insurance policy would cover all damages stemming from asbestos 
exposure or environmental contamination happening over the course of 
several decades. 
Lastly, all sums liability is plainly inequitable and results in a 
windfall to the policyholder.  This approach entitles a policyholder to 
receive premium-free coverage for periods during which it was self-
insured and for injury or damage happening outside of the policy period, 
in violation of the plain terms of the insurance contract.  Numerous 
courts have recognized the inequities of all sums liability, which 
ultimately acts to the detriment of the policyholder by forcing insurers to 
raise premiums.  This, in turn, causes insurers to be hesitant to issue 
policies with generous limits due to the risk that these generous limits 
2015] LONG-TAIL “ALL SUMS” INSURANCE CLAIMS 471 
will cause the insured to select a single policy year to cover the entirety 
of a loss spanning decades. 
A. “All Sums” is Fundamentally Inconsistent with a Continuous 
Trigger 
It is axiomatic that an insurer’s obligation to pay under a CGL policy 
is contingent on covered injury or damage happening during the policy 
period.
10
  CGL policies usually contain temporal limitations restricting 
coverage to bodily injury or property damage or to occurrences that take 
place during the applicable policy period.
11
  By their express terms, these 
policies are not intended to insure against all injury or damage—no 
matter when it happens.
12
  A policyholder purchases a policy to 
indemnify it for its liability for damage or injuries taking place within a 




Accordingly, the policyholder ordinarily must show that the damage 
or injury for which it seeks coverage took place while the policy was in 
effect, as well as the amount of the damages for which it is liable as a 
result of that damage or injury.  The policyholder is entitled to recover 
the damages for which it is liable up to the policy’s limits if the policy 
was in effect at the time of the damage or injury, and the policy 
otherwise covers liability for that damage or injury.
14
  However, it is 
considerably more difficult, if not impossible, to determine how to 
apportion damages arising from a claim involving bodily injury or 
property damage spanning long periods of time (such as asbestos bodily 
injury and environmental property damage claims).  Such claims usually 
do not involve damage or injury happening at a discrete point in time.
15
  
The progressive and indivisible nature of the injury or damage involved 
                                                          
 10.  7 COUCH ON INSURANCE § 102:2 (3d ed. 2003) (“It is a time-honored principle that the 
insurer’s obligation to pay is contingent on a covered loss occurring during the policy period.”).  
 11.  See Andrew Weiner & Joseph Saka, The Basics of Commercial General Liability Policies, 
AM. BAR ASS’N, 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/young_lawyers/publications/the_101_201_practice_series/the_b
asics_of_commercial_general_liability_policies.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2015). 
 12.   See 6B J.A. APPLEMAN & J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4254 at 26–27 
(Rev. ed. 1979). 
 13.  Olin Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 221 F.3d 307, 322–23 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing Michael G. 
Doherty, Allocating Progressive Injury Liability Among Successive Insurance Policies, 64 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 257, 270 (1997)). 
 14.  See 7 COUCH ON INSURANCE § 102:2, supra note 10. 
 15.  See Farmers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. N.J. Prop.-Liab. Ins. Guar. Ass’n, Nos. L-0619-09, L-
1004-09, 2011 WL 2671583, at *8 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 11, 2011).  
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in such claims has led most jurisdictions to adopt a presumption that the 
injury or damage is continuous.
16




A policy is “triggered” when a threshold event specified in the policy 
implicates coverage under the policy.
18
  The fact that a policy has been 
triggered means that the policy might cover liability arising from the 
specified event, subject to the policy’s other terms, including exclusions 
in the policy that may bar coverage for the loss, and subject to any other 
coverage defenses that may apply.
19
  The continuous trigger theory 
presumes that the injury or damage began at a particular point in time, 
and took place continuously until an appropriate “end” point.
20
  The 
purpose of the theory is to relieve the policyholder of the burden that it 
otherwise would have to show how much of the damages arising from 
the progressive damage or injury is attributable to the damage or injury 
that actually took place during the period insured by the policy under 
which the policyholder seeks coverage.
21
 
The continuous trigger theory, however, provides no basis for 
concluding that any more or less injury or damage took place in any 
given part of the injury or damage period.  One of the principle flaws 
inherent in the all sums scheme is that it permits the policyholder to 
“shoehorn” all of the damages due to injury or damage happening during 
                                                          
 16.  See Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo. v. Wallis & Cos., 986 P.2d 924, 939 (Colo. 1999) (en banc). 
 17.  See, e.g., Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo., 986 P.2d at 939; N. States Power Co. v. Fid. & Cas. Co. 
of N.Y., 523 N.W.2d 657, 662–64 (Minn. 1994); Spaulding Composites Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. 
Co., 819 A.2d 410, 415 (N.J. 2003).   
 18.   See Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo., 986 P.2d at 937 n.11. 
 19.   Id. 
 20.   See, e.g., Keene Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034, 1045–46 (D.C. Cir. 1981); 
Broderick Inv. Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 742 F. Supp. 571, 573 (D. Colo. 1989), rev’d 
on other grounds, 954 F.2d 601 (10th Cir. 1992); Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sussex Cty., 831 F. 
Supp. 1111, 1124 (D. Del. 1993), aff’d, 46 F.3d 1116 (3d Cir. 1994); Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Ex-
Cell-O Corp., 662 F. Supp. 71, 76 (E.D. Mich. 1987); GenCorp, Inc. v. AIU Ins. Co., 104 F. Supp. 
2d 740, 749 (N.D. Ohio 2000); Montrose Chem. Corp. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 913 P.2d 878, 880 (Cal. 
1995); United States Gypsum Co. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 643 N.E.2d 1226, 1257 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994); 
Spaulding Composites Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 819 A.2d 410, 415 (N.J. 2003); Towns v. N. 
Sec. Ins. Co., 964 A.2d 1150, 1165 (Vt. 2008); Soc’y Ins. v. Town of Franklin, 607 N.W.2d 342, 
346 (Wis. Ct. App. 2000). 
 21.  See, e.g., E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Admiral Ins. Co., No. 89C-AU-99, 1995 WL 
654020, at *26 (Del. Super. Ct. Oct. 27, 1995) (imposition of the continuous trigger theory 
“alleviated the difficulty of proving when contamination began and how much contamination 
occurred in each year”); Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Basic Chems. Co., No. 87C-SE-
11, 1994 Del. Super. LEXIS 722, at *7 (Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 13, 1994) (discussing that the 
continuous trigger theory arose because “[i]f the quantum of damages is not provable for any 
particular year, and if the insured is allocated the burden of proof of the extent of damage within 
each policy period, then coverage paid for will be defeated”). 
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the entire continuous trigger period into a single policy period.
22
  Thus, 
under all sums liability, a policyholder can hold a policy insuring a single 
year liable for damages spanning multiple years or decades.  The flaw in 
this outcome is made clear when the policy under which the policyholder 
seeks coverage has a policy period at the beginning or in the middle of 
the continuous trigger period.  In that situation, the all sums approach 
requires a policy to cover damages due to injury or damage happening 
well after the policy ceased providing insurance.  No court would hold 
that such a policy must cover damages attributable to injury or damage 
that clearly began after the policy terminated.  Yet all sums liability 
results in a logically indistinguishable outcome.  In this way, all sums is 
patently inconsistent with the continuous trigger theory; once the theory 
is applied, no single policy should be held responsible for damage or 
injury that presumptively took place outside of its policy period, 




The continuous trigger theory is a legal fiction that already relieves 
the policyholder of its burden to establish whether injury or damage 
happened during each policy period—a burden imposed by the plain 
meaning of the contract language.  This departs from what that language 
otherwise would require.  Courts should not compound the benefit 
conferred on the policyholder through the continuous trigger 
accommodation by using that benefit as justification for further 
abrogating the insurer’s right to rely on the plain meaning of its contract 
language through the imposition of all sums liability. 
B. All Sums Liability Impermissibly Ignores the Temporal Limitation in 
CGL Policies  
Insurance policies are contracts and are subject to the rules of 
contract construction.
24
  Accordingly, pursuant to the plain language in 
CGL policies, courts have held that the policyholder bears the initial 
burden to show that a claim falls within the terms of the policy.
25
  
Although the scope of coverage provided by CGL policies may vary, the 
                                                          
 22.  See Jones, supra note 3, at 37–39. 
 23.  See Mayor of Balt. v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 802 A.2d 1070, 1104 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002). 
 24.   1-5 NEW APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE LAW LIBRARY EDITION § 5.01 (Jeffrey E. Thomas 
ed.) (2015). 
 25.   3-18 NEW APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE LAW LIBRARY EDITION § 18.01[2] (Jeffrey E. 
Thomas ed.) (Library ed. 2015). 
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policy period is a vital part of these contracts.
26
  Absent an express 
provision to the contrary, the insurer is not liable for damages arising 
from bodily injury or property damage happening before or after the 
policy period.
27
  Thus, insurers calculate the premium for these policies 
based on an assessment of the potential risk of loss during that fixed 
period of time.  In other words, the policy period is a material term of the 
insurance contract.
28
  In exchange for the premium, the insurer agrees to 
pay for otherwise covered losses if, and only if, they arise from injury or 
damage happening within the agreed-upon period.
29
 
Most CGL policies explicitly limit coverage to bodily injury or 
property damage that happens during the applicable policy period (often 
in their “occurrence,” “bodily injury,” and/or “property damage” 
definitions).
30
  All sums liability contravenes the plain policy language 
by requiring policies to pay for damages due to injury or damage 
happening years or decades before or years or decades after their policy 
periods.
31
  All sums effectively enables policyholders to rewrite their 
insurance contracts by forcing insurers to pay for damages that they 
never agreed to insure, resulting from risks for which they never received 
premium. 
Numerous courts have recognized that all sums liability is 
inequitable and have observed that the approach is plainly inconsistent 
with the policy provisions limiting coverage to injury or damage during 
the policy period.
32
  As New York’s highest court succinctly stated: 
                                                          
 26.   3-22 NEW APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE LAW LIBRARY EDITION § 22.01[4] (Jeffrey E. 
Thomas ed.) (Library ed. 2015). 
 27.  Id.  
 28.  Id. 
 29.  Id.  
 30.  See 7 COUCH ON INSURANCE § 102:2, supra note 10. 
 31.  See, e.g., Arco Indus. Corp. v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 594 N.W.2d 61, 69 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1998) (rejecting “any method of allocation that would require [the insurer] to provide coverage on a 
joint and several or ‘all sums’ basis, since that method would require [the insurer] to indemnify [the 
policyholder] for damage occurring outside the policy period”). 
 32.  See, e.g., Olin Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 221 F.3d 307, 322–23 (2d Cir. 2000); Spartan 
Petrol. Co. v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 162 F.3d 805, 809 (4th Cir. 1998); Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. 
Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212, 1225 (6th Cir. 1980); Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo. v. Wallis 
& Cos., 986 P.2d 924, 938–39 (Colo. 1999) (en banc); Sec. Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Lumbermens 
Mut. Cas. Co., 826 A.2d 107, 117–18 (Conn. 2003); Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. 
Co., 670 N.E.2d 740, 748 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996); Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Stonewall 
Ins. Co., 71 P.3d 1097, 1132 (Kan. 2003); Mayor of Balt. v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 802 A.2d 1070, 
1100–01 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002); Bos. Gas Co. v. Century Indem. Co., 910 N.E.2d 290, 302–03 
(Mass. 2009); Arco Indus. Corp. v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 594 N.W.2d 61, 69–70 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1998), aff’d, 617 N.W.2d 330 (Mich. 2000); Domtar, Inc. v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 563 N.W.2d 724, 
732–33 (Minn. 1997); N. States Power Co. v. Fid. & Cas. Co. of N.Y., 523 N.W.2d 657, 662 (Minn. 
1994); Dutton-Lainson Co. v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 778 N.W.2d 433, 445 (Neb. 2010); EnergyNorth Nat. 
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[T]he policies provide indemnification for liability incurred as a result 
of an accident or occurrence during the policy period, not outside that 
period.  [The policyholder’s] singular focus on “all sums” would read 
this important qualification out of the policies.
33
 
Attempting to convert the isolated phrase “all sums,” which is often 
used at the beginning of the insuring agreement in CGL policies (“The 
[insurance] company will pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the 
insured shall become legally obligated to pay . . . as damages . . . .”
34
), 
into the answer for allocating long-tail claims is akin to “trying to place 
one’s hat on a rack that was never designed to hold it.”
35
  The all sums 
approach serves only to transform each policy into concurrent, rather 
than consecutive, coverage, with each policy having the same decades-
long policy period.  The approach disregards basic tenets of contract 
construction: to give meaning to all terms of an insurance policy; to 
harmonize all provisions of the policy and to avoid leaving some 
provisions without function or sense; and to construe the policy as a 
whole so as to give every clause meaning if reasonably possible.
36
 
C. All Sums Liability Violates the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations  
Under the “reasonable expectations” doctrine applied by some 
courts, ambiguities in an insurance policy are construed against the 
insurer when the policyholder has an objectively reasonable expectation 
of coverage.
37
  Ordinarily, policyholders employ this doctrine to avoid 
the coverage implications of the plain meaning of the language in their 
policies.  In arguing for all sums liability, however, policyholders ignore 
this doctrine by disregarding the reasonable expectations that arise from 
the plain meaning of the temporal limitation language in CGL policies. 
Numerous state supreme courts have agreed with this observation.  
For instance, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court observed: 
                                                          
Gas, Inc. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, 934 A.2d 517, 524–27 (N.H. 2007); Owens-Ill., Inc. v. 
United Ins. Co., 650 A.2d 974, 980 (N.J. 1994); Sharon Steel Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 931 
P.2d 127, 142 (Utah 1997); Towns v. N. Sec. Ins. Co., 964 A.2d 1150, 1162–66 (Vt. 2008).  
 33.  Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 774 N.E.2d 687, 695 (N.Y. 2002) (citation 
omitted). 
 34.  Owens-Ill., Inc., 650 A.2d at 978. 
 35.  Id. at 989. 
 36.  See, e.g., Liberty Ins. Underwriters, Inc. v. Weitz Co., 158 P.3d 209, 212 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
2007); Allianz Ins. Co. v. Guidant Corp., 900 N.E.2d 1218, 1235 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008); Auto-Owners 
Ins. Co. v. Churchman, 489 N.W.2d 431, 434 (Mich. 1992); Chochorowski v. Home Depot U.S.A., 
404 S.W.3d 220, 229–30 (Mo. 2013) (en banc). 
 37.  1-5 NEW APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE LAW LIBRARY EDITION § 5.05 (Jeffrey E. Thomas ed.) 
(2015). 
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No reasonable policyholder could have expected that a single one-year 
policy would cover all losses caused by toxic industrial wastes released 
into the environment over the course of several decades.  Any 
reasonable insured purchasing a series of occurrence-based policies 
would have understood that each policy covered it only for property 
damage occurring during the policy year.
38
 
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire similarly stated, “we doubt that 
[the policyholder] could have had a reasonable expectation that each 
single policy would indemnify [it] for liability related to property 
damage occurring due to events taking place years before and years after 
the term of each policy.”
39
 
State supreme courts have particularly highlighted the policyholder’s 
reasonable expectations when the relevant insurance program has 
significant periods of self-insurance.  These courts have observed that the 
policyholder must reasonably expect to shoulder liability during periods 
of self-insurance.  For instance, the Supreme Court of Utah has held that 
policyholders must be prepared to pay their fair share for years that they 
were without insurance, noting that when periods of no insurance reflect 
a decision to assume or retain a risk, it is reasonable to expect the risk-
bearer to share in the allocation.
40
  The Utah court cited favorably to the 
decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in 
Insurance Co. of North America v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc.
41
  That 
court recognized that it is entirely reasonable for a policyholder to be 
responsible for injury during periods when it had no insurance, and the 
all sums scheme would unreasonably provide a manufacturer that had 
purchased insurance for only one year out of twenty with the same 
coverage as a manufacturer that had bought coverage every year for two 
decades.
42
  As the court noted, “[n]either logic nor precedent support 
                                                          
 38.  Bos. Gas Co. v. Century Indem. Co., 910 N.E.2d 290, 309 (Mass. 2009). 
 39.  EnergyNorth Nat. Gas Inc. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, 934 A.2d 517, 526 (N.H. 
2007) (quoting Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo. v. Wallis & Cos., 986 P.2d 924, 940 (Colo. 1999)); see also 
Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo., 986 P.2d at 940 (“[T]here is no logic to support the notion that one single 
insurance policy among 20 or 30 years worth of policies could be expected to be held liable for the 
entire time period.  Nor is it reasonable to expect that a single-year policy would be liable, for 
example, if the insured carried no insurance at all for the other years covered by the occurrence.”); 
Sec. Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 826 A.2d 107, 121 (Conn. 2003) (“Neither 
the insurers nor the insured could reasonably have expected that the insurers would be liable for 
losses occurring in periods outside of their respective policy coverage periods.”); Mayor of Balt. v. 
Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 802 A.2d 1070, 1103–04 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002). 
 40.  Sharon Steel Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 931 P.2d 127, 141 (Utah 1997). 
 41.  Id. 
 42.  Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212, 1225 (6th Cir. 1980). 
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such a result.”
43
  Similarly, the Supreme Court of Vermont recognized 
that where the policyholder is self-insured for any period of time on the 
risk, it is “fair and reasonable to hold the policyholder responsible for 
that portion of the total defense and indemnity costs over which he or she 
chose to assume the risk.”
44
 
D. All Sums Unjustly Enriches Policyholders  
All sums liability also is inequitable in that it provides a policyholder 
with premium-free insurance for injury or damage happening outside of 
the periods for which it had obtained insurance.  In other words, the all 
sums approach unjustly enriches the policyholder.  If a policyholder fails 
to obtain insurance during a period, it must assume responsibility for the 
risk during that period; otherwise, it is effectively being granted free 
insurance for periods during which it went “bare.”
45
 
The sheer inequity of the all sums approach is illustrated by the 
hypothetical situation in which a policyholder is held liable for damage 
or injury taking place over 30 years, yet did not obtain insurance in 29 
out of those 30 years.  Under the all sums scheme, the policyholder 
would be permitted to force the policies in place in that one year to pay 
for all damages attributable to three decades of damage or injury, with no 
recourse against other carriers, even though the policyholder only paid 
premiums for one year of insurance.  This result certainly does not 
correlate the risks insured with the premiums charged.
46
 
Several cases have recognized this windfall component of all sums 
liability as a reason to reject it.  Olin Corp. v. Insurance Co. of North 
America
47
 is a prime example.  In Olin, the jury found that environmental 
soil damage had taken place from 1951 to 1985.
48
  One insurer, INA, had 
issued policies with periods from 1956 through 1973.
49
  However, a 
pollution exclusion barred coverage under the INA policies in effect 
from 1971 through 1973, and the jury found that policies with periods 
                                                          
 43.  Id. 
 44.  Towns v. N. Sec. Ins. Co., 964 A.2d 1150, 1167 (Vt. 2008) (citing Olin Corp. v. Ins. Co. of 
N. Am., 221 F.3d 307, 323 (2d Cir. 2000)). 
 45.  Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 670 N.E.2d 740, 749 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) 
(citing IMCERA Grp., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 583, 607 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996)); 
see also Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo. v. Wallis & Cos., 986 P.2d 924, 940 (Colo. 1991); Bos. Gas Co. v. 
Century Indem. Co., 910 N.E.2d 290, 311 (Mass. 2009). 
 46.  Uniroyal, Inc. v. Home Ins. Co., 707 F. Supp. 1368, 1392 (E.D.N.Y. 1988). 
 47.  221 F.3d 307 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 48.  Id. at 321. 
 49.  Id. 
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after 1957 did not cover the soil damage because that damage was not 
accidental after 1957.
50
  Therefore, although the damage took place over 
35 years, INA provided insurance for only two years: 1956 and 1957.
51
  
In rejecting the all sums approach in this context, the court noted that 
permitting the policyholder to recover from a single policy in effect in 
1956 or 1957 for all sums arising from its liability as a result of 
progressive damage taking place between 1956 and 1985 would be 




Similarly, in Security Insurance Co. of Hartford v. Lumbermens 
Mutual Casualty Co.
53
 all sums liability would have required an insurer 
to pay for injuries taking place during earlier periods covered by lost or 
destroyed policies that were issued by other carriers.  The injuries were 
alleged to have taken place from March 16, 1951 to May 1, 1996.
54
  
However, the policyholder had either lost or destroyed the policies in 
effect from March 1951 to January 1968.
55
  The all sums scheme would 
have imposed liability on the remaining carriers for amounts that 
otherwise would have been allocable to the missing policies.
56
  Rejecting 
this result, the court apportioned the damages evenly across the entire 
alleged injury period, with the policyholder responsible for the pro rata 
share allocated to the periods of the missing policies.
57
 
The court declined to impose liability on a single insurer for costs 
arising outside of its policy period and, thus, during periods for which the 
insurer received no premium because to do so would result in a windfall 
and unjustly enrich the policyholder.
58
  The court noted that the 
policyholder was the party who could have prevented the loss or 
destruction of the policies, and the remaining insurers bore no blame for 
that loss or destruction.
59
  Accordingly, the court found that it would be 
grossly inequitable to make the remaining insurers bear a loss arising 
from the acts and omissions of a policyholder who had, in essence, 
rendered itself uninsured for a substantial period.
60
  Numerous courts 
                                                          
 50.  Id. at 314. 
 51.  Id. at 327. 
 52.  Id. at 324. 
 53.  826 A.2d 107 (Conn. 2003). 
 54.  Id. at 111. 
 55.  Id.  
 56.  Id.at 126. 
 57.  Id.  
 58.  Id. 
 59.  Id.  
 60.  Id.  
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have decried the inequity of the all sums approach on similar grounds.
61
 
Not only is the all sums approach inequitable to insurers, but it is 
ultimately detrimental to policyholders’ interests.  Facing the prospect of 
exposure for damages due to injury or damage outside the policy period, 
the insurers’ incentive to insure against future risks is reduced, thereby 
creating instability in the insurance market.
62
  The uncertainty as to 
which policy or policies a policyholder will select to pay for a loss under 
the all sums scheme also creates an unnecessary incentive to litigate.  All 
sums liability also “requires insurers to ‘factor the costs of uncertain 
liability into their premiums.’”
63
  The all sums approach forces insurers 
to consider the possibility of exposure for injuries or damage happening 
outside of the policy period when calculating premiums, naturally 
causing premiums to rise.
64
  All sums liability also discourages insurers 
from providing policies with generous limits due to the increased 




III. APPLICATION OF ALL SUMS NECESSITATES COMPLEX LITIGATION 
TO RESOLVE A WEALTH OF SECONDARY ISSUES, THEREBY 
NEEDLESSLY CONSUMING JUDICIAL RESOURCES  
Not only does all sums liability distort or ignore policy language, but 
it also gives rise to a host of complex issues requiring substantial follow-
                                                          
 61.  See, e.g., Olin Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 221 F.3d 307, 324 (2d Cir. 2000); Spartan 
Petrol. Co. v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 162 F.3d 805, 812–13 (4th Cir. 1998); Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. 
Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212, 1225 (6th Cir. 1980); Nationwide Ins. Co. v. Cent. Mo. 
Elec. Coop., 278 F.3d 742, 747–48 (8th Cir. 2001); Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo. v. Wallis & Cos., 986 
P.2d 924, 939–40 (Colo. 1999); Sec. Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 826 A.2d 
107, 121–122 (Conn. 2003); Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 670 N.E.2d 740, 748–
49 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996); Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Stonewall Ins. Co., 71 P.3d 1097, 
1134 (Kan. 2003); Mayor of Balt. v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 802 A.2d 1070, 1103 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
2002); Bos. Gas Co. v. Century Indem. Co., 910 N.E.2d 290, 310 (Mass. 2009); Arco Indus. Corp. v. 
Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 594 N.W.2d 61, 69 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998), aff’d, 617 N.W.2d 330 (Mich. 
2000); Domtar, Inc. v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 563 N.W.2d 724, 732 (Minn. 1997); N. States Power 
Co. v. Fid. & Cas. Co. of N.Y., 523 N.W.2d 657, 662 (Minn. 1994); Dutton-Lainson Co. v. Cont’l 
Ins. Co., 778 N.W.2d 433, 445 (Neb. 2010); EnergyNorth Nat. Gas, Inc. v. Certain Underwriters at 
Lloyd’s, 934 A.2d 517, 524–25 (N.H. 2007); Owens-Ill., Inc. v. United Ins. Co., 650 A.2d 974, 989 
(N.J. 1994); Mt. McKinley Ins. Co. v. Corning, Inc., 96 A.D.3d 451, 453–54 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012); 
Sharon Steel Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 931 P.2d 127, 140 (Utah 1997); Towns v. N. Sec. Ins. 
Co., 964 A.2d 1150, 1167 (Vt. 2008). 
 62.  Owens-Ill., Inc., 650 A.2d at 990. 
 63.  Bos. Gas Co., 910 N.E.2d at 311 (citing EnergyNorth Nat. Gas, Inc., 934 A.2d at 527). 
 64.  See Michael G. Doherty, Allocating Progressive Injury Liability Among Successive 
Insurance Policies, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 257, 269–74 (1997). 
 65.  Id. 
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on litigation.  Thus, the all sums approach results in a significant waste 
of valuable judicial resources.  Namely, courts following the all sums 
approach will have to: (1) construe and determine how to apply “prior 
insurance/non-cumulation” clauses, which appear in many CGL policies; 
(2) determine how to construe and apply “other insurance” clauses 
typically found in CGL policies; (3) determine how to construe and 
apply subrogation clauses and equitable contribution principles between 
the insurers who are deemed liable; and (4) determine how the 
policyholder’s prior settlements with its insurers will affect reallocation 
in follow-on litigation among the remaining insurers. 
A. Courts Applying All Sums Must Construe and Determine How to 
Apply “Prior Insurance/Non-Cumulation” Clauses  
All sums liability increases the likelihood that courts will become 
embroiled in complicated questions regarding the impact of multiple 
insurance policy provisions on the reallocation of liability among 
insurers.  Among these provisions are “prior insurance/non-cumulation” 
clauses, which serve to reduce the limits of liability available under 
policies issued in any given year by amounts that are due for the same 
loss under policies issued in prior years.
66
  A typical version of one of 
these clauses, often found in CGL policies, reads as follows: 
If a loss covered by this policy is also covered in whole or in part under 
any other excess policy issued to the Insured prior to the effective date 
of this policy, the limits of liability as stated in the declarations will be 




A number of courts have found such clauses to be unambiguous and 
enforceable in the context of all sums liability.
68
 
                                                          
 66.   See, e.g., Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 928 F. Supp. 176, 181–82 
(N.D.N.Y. 1996); Cal. Ins. Co. v. Stimson Lumber Co., No. 01-514-HA, 2004 WL 1173185, at *10 
(D. Or. May 26, 2004), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 325 F. App’x 496, 500 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 67.  See Stimson Lumber Co., 2004 WL 1173185, at *10. 
 68.  See, e.g., Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Treesdale, Inc., 418 F.3d 330, 341–44 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(enforcing non-cumulation clause); Plantation Pipeline Co. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., No. 1:03-CV-281l-
WBH, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80680, at *7–9 (N.D. Ga. July 8, 2008) (holding that the term “loss” 
in the non-cumulation clause not ambiguous when viewed in the context of the clause’s remaining 
phrasing); O-I Brockway Glass Container v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., No. 90-2797(AET), 1994 WL 
910935, at *2 (D. N.J. Feb. 10, 1994) (“no confusion or ambiguity exists regarding the Non-
Cumulation clause.  ‘[T]he words of an insurance policy should be given their ordinary meaning, 
and in the absence of an ambiguity, a court should not engage in a strained construction to support 
the imposition of liability.’”) (citing Longobardi v. Chubb Ins. Co., 582 A.2d 1257 (N.J. 1990)); Air 
Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., No. 86-7501, 1989 WL 73656, at *2 
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Historically, policyholders have attempted to use non-cumulation 
clauses to support application of all sums liability, arguing that the clause 
shows that insurers contemplated that their policies covered injury or 
damage happening outside of their policy periods.
69
  Because courts have 
deemed non-cumulation clauses to be valid and enforceable, the impact 
of such clauses under the all sums approach must be determined as well.  
In fact, as noted, courts have recognized the applicability of these clauses 
in the all sums context.
70
 
B. Courts Must Construe and Apply “Other Insurance” Clauses 
Similarly, courts adopting all sums liability also must determine the 
effect of “other insurance” clauses.  “Other insurance” clauses establish 
how a loss is to be apportioned among insurers when more than one 
policy covers the same loss.  These clauses typically apply to situations 
involving concurrent insurance, i.e., where two or more policies insuring 
the same time period cover the same loss.
71
  Although such clauses 
should not be relevant in cases involving consecutive insurance for long-
term bodily injury or property damage claims, the application of all sums 
effectively converts consecutive insurance into concurrent insurance by 
rendering each policy liable for the entirety of a loss (up to its limits).  
This, in turn, requires courts to analyze the impact of these clauses in the 
all sums context. 
                                                          
(E.D. Pa. June 30, 1989), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 25 F.3d 177 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding that there 
was no basis to fail to refuse the terms of the non-cumulation clause); Stonewall Ins. Co. v. E.I. du 
Pont de Nemours & Co., 996 A.2d 1254, 1259 (Del. 2010) (holding that the unambiguous non-
cumulation clause was properly applied); Hercules, Inc. v. AIU Ins. Co., 784 A.2d 481, 494 (Del. 
2001) (enforcing a non-cumulation clause); Mark IV Indus., Inc. v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 819 
N.Y.S.2d 210, 210 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006) (ordinary language of the non-cumulation provision 
applied); Hiraldo v. Allstate Ins. Co., 840 N.E.2d 563, 564–65 (N.Y. 2005) (enforcing a non-
cumulation clause). 
 69.  See, e.g., Hercules, Inc., 784 A.2d at 493–94; Chi. Bridge & Iron Co. v. Certain 
Underwriters at Lloyd’s, 797 N.E.2d 434, 441 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003). 
 70.  See, e.g., Stonewall Ins. Co., 996 A.2d at 1259–60 (“Under the all sums approach, DuPont 
may choose a single tower of coverage, applicable to a single year, from which to seek indemnity 
and defense costs. . . .  The non-cumulation clause does not create an ambiguity which alters this 
process. . . .  [I]nterpreting the non-cumulation clause to limit how much DuPont may seek from the 
selected tower of insurance by subtracting any amounts received by or payable to DuPont from prior 
excess insurers, is the only proper interpretation.”); Viking Pump, Inc. v. Century Indem. Co., 2 
A.3d 76, 126 (Del. Ch. 2009) (“[T]he use of the all sums approach with faithful application of the 
Non-Cumulation and Prior Insurance Provisions accomplishes many of the same policy purposes as 
the pro rata method.”). 
 71.  See, e.g., Keene Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034, 1051 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (“When 
more than one policy applies to a loss, the ‘other insurance’ provisions of each policy provide a 
scheme by which the insurers’ liability is to be apportioned.”); Schoenecker v. Haines, 277 N.W.2d 
782, 783–84 (Wis. 1979). 
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There are three general categories of “other insurance” clauses: 
“escape clauses,” which seek to avoid all liability; “pro rata clauses,” 
which limit the liability of an insurer to a proportion of the total loss; and 




One typical “escape clause” provides, “If with respect to loss and 
ultimate net loss covered hereunder, the insured has other insurance, 
whether on a primary, excess, or contingent basis, there shall be no 
insurance afforded hereunder as respects loss and ultimate net 
loss . . . .”
73
  When more than one policy is involved in a claim, such a 
clause would shift all responsibility for the claim onto the other involved 
policy or policies.  However, if all of the competing policies contain an 
escape clause, applying those clauses would leave the policyholder with 
no coverage at all. 
A typical excess “other insurance” clause provides, “If other 
collectible insurance with any other insurer is available to the Insured 
covering a loss also covered hereunder . . . the insurance hereunder shall 
be in excess of, and shall not contribute with, such other insurance.”
74
  
When more than one policy is involved in a claim, this clause would 
require the other policies to pay first and exhaust their limits before the 
policy containing the excess clause is required to pay anything.  A 
problem arises, however, when two triggered policies each contain such 
an excess clause. 
Still other policies contain a pro rata “other insurance” clause.  A 
typical version of this type of clause provides: 
If the insured has other insurance against a loss covered by . . . this 
policy the company shall not be liable under this policy for a greater 
proportion of such loss than the applicable limit of liability stated in the 
declarations bears to the total applicable limit of all valid and 
collectible insurance against such loss.
75
 
When multiple policies are involved in a dispute, they will often 
                                                          
 72.  Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 155 F. Supp. 2d 429, 431 n.3 
(E.D. Pa. 2001); Nationwide Ins. Co. v. Horace Mann Ins. Co., 759 A.2d 9, 11 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000).  
 73.  See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Am. Home Assur. Co., Nos. A-6706-01T5, A-6720-
01T5, 2004 WL 1878764, at *15–16 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. July 8, 2004); 8a-204Af APPLEMAN 
ON INSURANCE LAW & PRACTICE ARCHIVE § 4910 (2013), LexisNexis. 
 74.  See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. LiMauro, 482 N.E.2d 13, 19 (N.Y. 1985). 
 75.  Econ. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Western States Mut. Ins. Co., 198 N.E.2d 723, 727 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1964); see, e.g., W9/PHC Real Estate LP v. Farm Family Cas. Ins. Co., 970 A.2d 382, 394 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009) (citing 15 COUCH ON INSURANCE 3d § 219:27 (2005)). 
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contain competing clauses, requiring a court to reconcile them.
76
  In such 
situations a court is likely to be presented with policies containing a 
combination of different types of “other insurance” clauses.  Reconciling 
and applying these clauses correctly is a highly burdensome and labor-
intensive task, particularly in the context of larger insurance programs 
and long-tail claims covering extended periods. 
C. Courts Must Determine How to Construe Subrogation Clauses and 
How to Apply Equitable Subrogation and Contribution Rights 
When all sums liability is imposed, the policyholder’s initial suit 
determines the policies from which the policyholder is entitled to select.  
The selected insurer(s) must then initiate a subsequent suit or pursue 
continuing litigation to obtain contribution from the other insurers whose 
policies were triggered, but whose policies the policyholder did not 
choose.
77
  Rather than remedying the allocation problem, the all sums 
scheme merely postpones it by improvidently dividing what should be a 
single piece of litigation into two separate suits or at least a single 
prolonged suit involving two phases.
78
  The follow-on contribution 
proceedings involve issues identical to those at issue in the initial 
coverage proceeding, compounding the resultant judicial inefficiency.
79
 
Moreover, subsequent actions among insurers are far more 
complicated than the simple, straightforward application of pro rata 
allocation.  In such actions, courts have tended to adopt one of two 
approaches: (1) contribution or (2) subrogation. 
Equitable contribution grants an insurer who has paid a claim the 
right to recover from a co-insurer where both insurers were obligated to 
indemnify or defend the claim and where the co-insurer did not share, or 
did not sufficiently share, in doing so.
80
  Equitable subrogation also 
arises when one person has involuntarily paid a debt for which another 
                                                          
 76.  See, e.g., Planet Ins. Co. v. Ertz, 920 S.W.2d 591, 595 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996) (Missouri law 
requires a court to analyze the other insurance clauses in the policies before it “for repugnancy and 
conflicts, and dissimilar types of clauses are analyzed for specificity.”). 
 77.  Contribution claims require a subsequent trial because, as a rule, the right to contribution is 
not enforceable until the party seeking contribution has paid more than its share of a common 
obligation.  See 18 AM. JUR. 2d Contribution § 11 (2015). 
 78.  Bos. Gas Co. v. Century Indem. Co., 910 N.E.2d 290, 311 (Mass. 2009) (citing 
EnergyNorth Nat. Gas, Inc. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, 934 A.2d 517, 527 (N.H. 2007)). 
 79.  Olin Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 221 F.3d 307, 323 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting In re 
Prudential Lines Inc., 158 F.3d 65, 85 (2d Cir. 1998)). 
 80.  8a-204Af APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE LAW & PRACTICE ARCHIVE § 4921 (2013), 
LexisNexis. 
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was liable and which, in equity, should have been paid by the latter.
81
 
Contractual subrogation also may arise from a contract that grants 
the right to pursue reimbursement from a third party in exchange for 
payment of a loss.
82
  CGL policies are likely to contain subrogation 
clauses.  A typical subrogation clause provides: 
The Insurer shall be subrogated to all of the “Insured’s” rights of 
recovery with respect to any payment made under this Policy.  In this 
regard, the “Insured” shall execute any documentation required to 
enforce such rights and shall co-operate in all respects with the Insurer 
to assist in the enforcement of such rights.  The “Insured” shall do 
nothing to interfere with or impair the Insurer’s right of subrogation.
83
 
Because of their nature, excess policies are likely to contain more 
complex subrogation clauses.  One such clause provides: 
Because this policy affords excess coverage, the Insured’s right of 
recovery cannot always be exclusively subrogated to the Company.  It 
is therefore agreed that the company shall act in concert with all other 
interests concerned, including the Insured, in the enforcement of any 
subrogation rights or in the recovery of amounts by any other means.  
The apportioning of any amounts so recovered shall follow in the 
principle that any interest, including the Insured, that shall have paid an 
amount over and above any payment under this policy shall first be 
reimbursed up to the amount paid by such interest; the Company shall 
then be reimbursed out of any balance then remaining up to the amount 
paid as the result of loss covered under this policy; and lastly, the 
interests, including the Insured, of whom this coverage is in excess are 
entitle[d] to claim any residue remaining.  Expenses and costs 
necessary to the recovery of any such amount shall be apportioned 
between the interests concerned, including the Insured, in the ratio of 
their respective recoveries or in the event of a totally unsuccessful 




While a paying insurer holds its own independent contribution rights, 
in the case of either equitable or contractual subrogation, “the insurer 
stands in the shoes of the insured, obtaining only those rights held by the 
insured against a third party, subject to any defenses held by the third 
                                                          
 81.  Cont’l Cas. Co. v. N. Am. Capacity Ins. Co., 683 F.3d 79, 85 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Mid-
Continent Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 236 S.W.3d 765, 774 (Tex. 2007)). 
 82.  Id. 
 83.  JOSEPH D. JEAN & MATTHEW D. STOCKWELL, Fall 2014-97 APPLEMAN: CURRENT 
CRITICAL ISSUES IN INSURANCE LAW II (2014), LexisNexis. 
 84. See, e.g., Lloyds of London Policy Form CL010 (09/02), LLOYDS OF LONDON, 
ftp://139.142.150.99/bajaweb/policy/forms/CL010.pdf (last visited Sept. 19, 2015).  
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party against the insured.”
85
 
Thus, in addressing follow-on contribution claims, a court must first 
concern itself with the distinctions between the paying insurer(s) claims 
for recovery from non-selected insurers under theories of equitable 
contribution, equitable subrogation, and contractual subrogation.  Then, 
the court must consider the bases for such claims under the applicable 
law in order to determine the extent to which the paying insurer(s) can 
enforce contribution or subrogation rights against insurers who were not 
selected to pay.  For example, the court may be required to determine the 
extent to which the controlling law allows paying insurers to assert either 
contribution or subrogation claims against settled insurers, and/or the 
extent to which that body of law allows paying excess insurers to assert 
contribution or subrogation claims against primary insurers. 
Courts have noted the difficulties in implementing both contribution 
and subrogation.  As one court observed, “Even a cursory reading of 
judicial decisions in this area reveals a great deal of confusion in the 
courts about the equitable doctrines of subrogation and contribution, their 
differences and their appropriate applications to various factual 
circumstances.”
86
  The relevant principles often are misunderstood and, 
many times, the doctrines are used interchangeably.  In fact, it is 
“difficult to think of two legal concepts that have caused more confusion 




Moreover, the utility of contribution actions to resolve the inequities 
brought about by the application of all sums is largely illusory, in 
substantial part because contribution generally is not available against 
the policyholder for uninsured periods.  Any recovery in a contribution 
action also may be impossible because, for example, the insurer who 
issued other triggered policies is insolvent and unable to pay.
88
  The all 
                                                          
 85.  Cont’l Cas. Co., 683 F.3d at 85 (quoting Mid-Continent Ins. Co., 236 S.W.3d at 774). 
 86.  U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Federated Rural Elec. Ins. Corp., 37 P.3d 828, 832 (Okla. 2001). 
 87.  Id. (quoting Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Md. Cas. Co., 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 296, 302 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1998)). 
 88.  Olin Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 221 F.3d 307, 324 (2d Cir. 2000) (“Allocation is 
appropriate to prevent [the policyholder] from imposing liability on [the insurer] for injuries that 
occurred during those periods and arose largely from accidents during these periods in which [the 
policyholder] was not paying for coverage.  In the context of this litigation, moreover, allocation 
serves the cause of efficiency.  Any ‘contribution action’ [the insurer] might be entitled to bring 
under the joint and several approach, against [the policyholder] for the latter’s period of self-
insurance . . . would involve many of the same issues that arose in this proceeding.  The duplication 
of effort and expense is unnecessary.”); see also In re Prudential Lines Inc., 158 F.3d 65, 85 (2d Cir. 
1998) (“The courts that have endorsed allocation when the loss is paid have generally been 
motivated by considerations of equity and policy, rather than contract wording.  First, these courts 
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sums approach thus unfairly forces solvent carriers to assume the burden 
of the policyholder’s business decision to self-insure or under-insure 
particular time periods and to absorb the consequences of the 
insolvencies of other insurers chosen by the policyholder.  Equity 
dictates that “the risk of such defalcation fall on the insured, which 
purchased the defaulting insurer’s policy, rather than on another insurer 
which was a stranger to the selection process.”
89
 
D. Courts Must Determine How a Policyholder’s Prior Settlements with 
Insurers Impact “All Sums” Liability   
The all sums scheme also requires a court to grapple with how to 
integrate credits for settlements by other carriers into the follow-on 
contribution or subrogation proceedings.  These issues include such 
questions as: (1) the impact of a policyholder’s decision to settle with 
carriers that issued policies in years other than the one it now wants to 
choose;
90
 (2) the amounts of the settlement credits to be provided;
91
 and 
(3) the impact of the scope of the releases in the settlements on the scope 
of, and responsibility for, settlement credits.
92
  Resolution of these issues 
will likely entangle courts in time-consuming discovery disputes 
concerning confidential settlement negotiations and settlement 
agreements in order to unravel the precise nature and effect of prior 
settlements and their impact upon the selected insurers’ ultimate 
obligations.  Thus, all sums liability creates subsequent, complex 
apportionment and reallocation problems without any clear resolution.  It 
serves only to increase litigation costs, while providing no guidance as to 
the solutions for the conundrums it raises.
93
  While purporting to resolve 
the allocation issue, all sums merely postpones and complicates it. 
                                                          
have sought to ensure that a single insurer underwriting a small proportion of the risk does not get 
saddled with the full loss, . . . a loss that may prove uncollectible from other companies.”); Bos. Gas 
Co. v. Century Indem. Co., 910 N.E.2d 290, 311 (Mass. 2009). 
 89.  Olin Corp., 221 F.3d at 323. 
 90.  See, e.g., Koppers Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 98 F.3d 1440, 1452 (3d Cir. 1996); Mass. 
Elec. Co. v. Commercial Union Ins., No. 9900467B, 2005 WL 3489874, at *2 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 
25, 2005). 
 91.  See, e.g., Goodrich Corp. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., Nos. 23585, 23586, 2008 WL 
2581579, at *7–8 (Ohio Ct. App. June 30, 2008).  
 92.  See, e.g., Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 15 P.3d 115, 126–27 (Wash. 
2000).   
 93.  See Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo. v. Wallis & Cos., 986 P.2d 924, 939–40 (Colo. 1999).   
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IV. PRO RATA BY TIME-ON-THE-RISK ALLOCATION AVOIDS ALL OF THE 
PITFALLS OF ALL SUMS LIABILITY 
Adopting the pro rata by time-on-the-risk method for allocating 
losses resulting from long-tail claims, rather than applying the 
“intuitively suspect”
94
 all sums scheme, comports with the relevant 
policy language and facilitates a far more equitable result.  The pro rata 
approach divides the total damages by the number of years during which 
the injury or damage took place, thus allocating the damages evenly to 
each year, unless any interested party can rebut the presumption that the 
injury or damage happened evenly over the relevant period.
95
  The pro 
rata approach is consistent with the application of a continuous trigger,
96
 
since both acknowledge the inherent uncertainty as to what actually 
transpired during any particular policy period with respect to long-tail 
claims.
97
  Pro rata allocation relieves policyholders of their burden to 
prove the amount of injury or damage that happened in each policy 




The pro rata by time-on-the-risk method is also consistent with the 
temporal limitations in CGL policies, which plainly limit coverage to 
damage or injury taking place during the policy period.  This stands in 
stark contrast to all sums liability, which ignores this fundamental aspect 
of these policies.
99
  Thus, courts rejecting all sums liability have 
                                                          
 94.  Owens-Ill., Inc. v. United Ins. Co., 650 A.2d 974, 989 (N.J. 1994) (“the argument that all 
sums to be assessed because of long-term exposure to asbestos could have been established in any 
one of the policy years is intuitively suspect . . . ”).   
 95.  See, e.g., Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212, 1224–25 (6th 
Cir. 1980) (allowing any party to prove specific years of exposure); Sec. Ins. Co. of Hartford v. 
Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 826 A.2d 107, 121 (Conn. 2003); Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty 
Mut. Ins. Co., 670 N.E.2d 740, 749 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996); Bos. Gas Co. v. Century Indem. Co., 910 
N.E.2d 290, 312 (Mass. 2009); Arco Indus. Corp. v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 594 N.W.2d 61, 69 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1998), aff’d, 617 N.W.2d 330 (Mich. 2000).   
 96.   See, e.g., Outboard Marine Corp., 670 N.E.2d at 748; U.S. Gypsum Co. v. Admiral Ins. 
Co., 643 N.E.2d 1226, 1257 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994); EnergyNorth Nat. Gas, Inc. v. Certain Underwriters 
at Lloyd’s, 934 A.2d 517, 526 (N.H. 2007).   
 97.  Mayor of Balt. v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 802 A.2d 1070, 1104 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002).   
 98.  See Doherty, supra note 64, at 278–79.   
 99.  See, e.g., Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo. v. Wallis & Cos., 986 P.2d 924, 940 (Colo. 1999) (where 
continuous trigger rule applies, courts “should make a reasonable estimate of the portion of the 
‘occurrence’ that is fairly attributable to each year by dividing the total amount of liability by the 
number of years at issue”); Arco Indus. Corp., 594 N.W.2d at 69 (pro rata allocation is the “logical 
corollary” of the occurrence policy covering damage sustained during, but not outside, the policy 
period); EnergyNorth Nat. Gas, Inc., 934 A.2d at 526 (deeming “pro rata allocation to be superior to 
joint and several allocation because it is more consistent” with the continuous trigger theory); 
Consol. Edison Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 774 N.E.2d 687, 695 (N.Y. 2002) (“Pro rata allocation . . . is 
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concluded that, where the policyholder is self-insured for any period of 
time on the risk, it is fair and reasonable to hold the policyholder 
accountable for that portion of the total costs allocable to the self-insured 
period.
100
  Pro rata allocation “forces companies to internalize part of the 
costs of long-tail liability and creates incentives for companies to 
minimize environmental carelessness by not permitting a policyholder 
who chooses not to be insured for part of the long-tail injury period to 
recover as if the policyholder had been fully covered for that period.”
101
 
Pro rata allocation also presents several other advantages over all 
sums liability.  These advantages include “spreading the risk to the 
maximum number of carriers, easily identifying each insurer’s liability 
through a relatively simple calculation, and reducing the necessity for 
subsequent indemnification actions between and among the insurers.”
102
  
Pro rata allocation avoids unjustly saddling one insurer with the entirety 
of the policyholder’s loss, and it eliminates the risk that any contribution 
or subrogation rights will be reduced or abrogated due to uninsured 
periods and insurer insolvencies.
103
  In doing so, the pro rata approach 
“promotes judicial efficiency, engenders stability and predictability in 
the insurance market, provides incentive for responsible commercial 
behavior, and produces an equitable result.”
104
 
Last but not least, unlike the myriad problems inherent in the all 
sums approach, pro rata by time-on-the-risk allocation is straightforward 
to implement.  With “intuitive, commonsense appeal,” its inherent 
simplicity promotes predictability, minimizes the need for protracted, 
complex follow-on litigation, and ultimately reduces premium rates.
105
  
“Once a court determines the scope of the progressive injury . . . it can 
                                                          
consistent with the language of the policies” which “provide indemnification for liability incurred as 
a result of an accident or occurrence during the policy period, not outside that period.”).   
 100.  See, e.g., Outboard Marine Corp., 670 N.E.2d at 748 (allocating damages to the 
policyholder for the years during which it carried no insurance “is the only fair approach”); Towns v. 
N. Sec. Ins. Co., 964 A.2d 1150, 1167 (Vt. 2008) (holding policyholder responsible for all costs 
when self-insured).   
 101.  EnergyNorth Nat. Gas, Inc., 934 A.2d at 526.   
 102.  Towns v. N. Sec. Ins. Co., 964 A.2d 1150, 1166 (Vt. 2008).   
 103.  Olin Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 221 F.3d 307, 323 (2d Cir. 2000); Bos. Gas Co. v. 
Century Indem. Co., 910 N.E.2d 290, 311 (Mass. 2009); see also In re Prudential Lines Inc., 158 
F.3d 65, 85 (2d Cir. 1998) (“these courts see allocation as the most efficient way to assign liability 
among policies, reasoning that any contribution proceeding will involve many of the same issues 
that are raised in the initial liability proceeding, and that it is more efficient to deal with these issues 
in a single proceeding”).   
 104.  Bos. Gas Co., 910 N.E.2d at 311.   
 105.  Arco Indus. Corp., 594 N.W.2d at 70 (citing Michael G. Doherty, Allocating Progressive 
Injury Liability Among Successive Insurance Policies, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 257, 281–83 (1997)).  
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readily allocate the damages among the triggered policies.”
106
  Provisions 
such as the non-cumulation clause would not even apply and need not be 
analyzed under pro rata allocation, since under this approach no one 
policy year is paying for the same damages, or the same loss, as policies 
in other years.  Thus, under the pro rata approach such clauses are not 
even implicated.
107
  Several jurisdictions have adopted pro rata allocation 





                                                          
 106.  Id.   
 107.  See, e.g., Spaulding Composites Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 819 A.2d 410, 422 (N.J. 
2003) (explaining that once a court adopts pro rata allocation, the non-cumulation clause “drops out” 
of the policy).   
 108.  See, e.g., Nationwide Ins. Co. v. Cent. Mo. Elec. Coop., 278 F.3d 742, 748 (8th Cir. 2001); 
Olin Corp., 221 F.3d at 324–25; Spartan Petrol. Co. v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 162 F.3d 805, 812 
(4th Cir. 1998); Gulf Chem. & Metallurgical Corp. v. Associated Metals & Minerals Corp., 1 F.3d 
365, 371–72 (5th Cir. 1993); Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Sepco Corp., 765 F.2d 1543, 1544 (11th 
Cir. 1985); Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d 1212, 1224–25 (6th Cir. 
1980); Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo. v. Wallis & Cos., 986 P.2d 924, 939–40 (Colo. 1999); Sec. Ins. Co. v. 
Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 826 A.2d 107, 123 (Conn. 2003); Sentinel Ins. Co. v. First Ins. Co. of 
Haw., Ltd., 875 P.2d 894, 918 (Haw. 1994); Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 670 
N.E.2d 740, 748 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996); Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Stonewall Ins. Co., 71 
P.3d 1097, 1134 (Kan. 2003); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Commonwealth, 179 S.W.3d 830, 842 (Ky. 
2005); Norfolk S. Corp. v. Cal. Union Ins. Co., 859 So. 2d 201, 208 (La. Ct. App. 2003); Mayor of 
Balt. v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 802 A.2d 1070, 1101–04 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002); Bos. Gas Co., 910 
N.E.2d at 312; Arco Indus. Corp., 594 N.W.2d at 69; N. States Power Co. v. Fid. & Cas. Co. of 
N.Y., 523 N.W.2d 657, 662–64 (Minn. 1994); Mallinckrodt Inc. v. Cont’l Ins. Co., No. 05CC-
001214, 2012 WL 5869877 (Mo. Cir. Ct. of St. Louis Cty. Nov. 9, 2012); Dutton-Lainson Co. v. 
Cont’l Ins. Co., 778 N.W.2d 433, 445 (Neb. 2010); EnergyNorth Nat. Gas, Inc. v. Certain 
Underwriters at Lloyd’s, 934 A.2d 517, 527 (N.H. 2007); Owens-Ill., Inc. v. United Ins. Co., 650 
A.2d 974, 993–95 (N.J. 1994); Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 774 N.E.2d 687, 
694–95 (N.Y. 2002); Sharon Steel Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 931 P.2d 127, 140–42 (Utah 
1997); Towns v. N. Sec. Ins. Co., 964 A.2d 1150, 1167 (Vt. 2008).   
